Dissolution inévitable Élire en 2027 l’Assemblée de 2029 (Par Dr Cheikh Omar DIALLO)
The rejection of the supplementary budget bill in committee raises a question that goes beyond public finances: how far can the executive and the parliamentary majority continue this unprecedented confrontation? A second dissolution, in just over two years, paving the way for early legislative elections in 2027, will establish a legislature with which the President-elect will have to govern in 2029.
For the past few months, through ordinary and extraordinary sessions, the executive and legislative branches have been openly clashing. Behind these legal, political, socio-economic confrontations lies another agenda; if early legislative elections were held in the first quarter of 2027, the ballot box could foreshadow, define the limits and contours of the power emerging from the 2029 presidential election.
On Friday, October 30th, the Finance and Budget Control Committee once again rejected the supplementary budget bill. This vote foreshadows its final rejection in plenary session. Regardless, whether adopted or rejected, the supplementary budget bill does not present any truly significant legal issues. The questions raised are primarily budgetary and accounting in nature, which will be easily identified and examined by the Court of Auditors during its audit of budget execution.
However, the decisive battle will take place at the level of the initial 2027 budget bill. The conflict would change in dimension if it were to compromise the adoption of the annual budget, by regularly causing essential texts to fail, thus preventing the formation of stable parliamentary support.
Moreover, one requirement is paramount: ensuring the financial continuity of the State. It is then that the President of the Republic can invoke Article 68 – this budgetary “Big Bertha” whose power remains constrained by positive law.
Indeed, paragraphs 5 to 7 stipulate: “If the draft finance law is not definitively adopted by the expiry of the sixty-day period provided for, it shall be brought into force by decree, taking into account the amendments adopted by the National Assembly and accepted by the President of the Republic. If, in accordance with the procedure provided for above, the finance law for the year has not been brought into force before the start of the fiscal year, the President of the Republic is authorized to renew, by decree, the services already adopted. The Court of Auditors assists the President of the Republic, the Government, and the National Assembly in monitoring the implementation of finance laws.”
At this stage of our political analysis, two mechanisms must therefore be distinguished: the implementation of the project by decree upon expiry of the constitutional deadline, under the conditions provided for, and the renewal of the services voted on when the annual budget cannot come into force on time.
That being said, budgetary continuity does not resolve the political conflict. If the confrontation paralyzes public action for an extended period and if attempts at compromise fail, dissolution will be inevitable. It will allow the disagreement, which the institutions can no longer overcome, to be put to the voters.
However, its exercise is subject to precise rules. Article 87 of the Constitution states explicitly: “The President of the Republic may, after obtaining the opinion of the Prime Minister and that of the President of the National Assembly, dissolve the National Assembly by decree. However, the dissolution may not take place during the first two years of the legislative term. The decree of dissolution sets the date of the election of deputies. The election takes place no less than 60 days and no more than 90 days after the date of publication of said decree.”
This is where the resolution of the crisis intersects with the prospect of 2029. An Assembly elected in 2027 will continue its mandate after the next presidential election. Thus, starting in 2027, the Senegalese people will elect the Assembly with which the President of 2029 will govern. The ballot boxes convened to resolve the current situation will shape the conditions of future power.
One dissolution, three schemes
Assuming a five-year legislative term runs its full course, an Assembly elected in 2027 will sit until 2032. This projection assumes no further dissolutions or changes to the applicable rules.
The president elected in 2029 will therefore face a national assembly formed approximately two years prior. Whether it is the incumbent head of state re-elected or another winner, their election will not automatically grant them a parliamentary majority.
For the presidential camp, early elections will offer an opportunity to find ways to govern until 2029 and establish a foothold beyond that date. For their opponents, they will allow them to consolidate an institutional force capable of influencing the next presidency. Coalition partners will also take on new importance. An alliance formed to win seats can then influence the choice of candidates and the policy commitments for 2029.
As early as 2027, Senegalese people could elect the MPs who will support or limit the actions of the President they choose in 2029.
Preparing for a dissolution means anticipating both victory and the consequences of defeat. This then raises an incidental question: How can one govern with an opposition that the ballot box has strengthened, when one was counting on it to weaken it?
The power to call elections is never the power to dictate a majority. A dissolution would therefore open up three scenarios, with different consequences for the running of the state and preparations for 2029.
First scenario: a majority in favor of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye. The head of state regains parliamentary support (KIIRAAY) to pass his budgets and reforms. The dissolution will then have achieved its immediate objective: restoring the capacity to govern. This majority could also serve as a foundation for a potential candidacy for his re-election.
Second scenario: a majority in favor of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Ousmane Sonko. The Speaker will face an opposition now reinvigorated and strengthened by a consultation he himself initiated. It will be politically more difficult for him to portray this Assembly as an obstacle lacking popular support. He will have to work with it, negotiate his priorities, and consider the necessary government adjustments. For PASTEF, this victory will offer its candidate an advantageous position for 2029. At the same time, it will impose a responsibility on them: to demonstrate that they can propose solutions and contribute to governing, beyond their capacity to oppose.
A third likely scenario: an Assembly without an absolute majority. No single party will hold enough seats to permanently impose its choices. Fewer parties could become decisive and form "blocking minorities": their support would allow a budget to be passed, a government to be supported, or a majority to be formed on certain reforms. This would constitute political co-decision-making.
Two paths are emerging: a stable agreement between several forces, based on shared commitments, or text-by-text negotiations, which are more uncertain. The alliances formed in 2027 would then influence the candidacies and platforms of 2029.
In conclusion, a dissolution can therefore resolve a power struggle that has become untenable. It can also strengthen the opponent or make compromise even more essential. In the first quarter of 2027, the Senegalese people will be able to determine some of the conditions of power in 2029 even before choosing who will wield it. Crucial!
Dr. Cheikh Omar Diallo
Doctor of Political Science
Communication expert - Founder of EAO
Commentaires (18)
Alors, d'où vient la différence d'avec le Sénégal ? Elle vient du fait que la France est habituée à un pouvoir qui ne contrôle pas l'assemblée, à une assemblée indépendante de l'exécutif. C'est tout. Au Sénégal, même avec certains de nos intellectuels, avec leurs grands airs, n'ont pas un esprit préparé à la liberté, tellement ils sont habitués à la dictature, surtout celle de Macky Sall.
Seul hic , c'est que l' autoproclamé expert en art oratoire n'a ni l'éloquence ni le charisme quand il veut parler...
Je l'ai vu à deux reprises passer à la télé, mais le monsieur fait rire, tellement il surjoue, tellement il se met en scène, il en fait trop avec son langage corporel qu'on croirait qu'il joue sa partition dans une comédie de Shakespeare...
Bref... le monsieur est un dorkatt de plus que le peuple sénégalais découvrira...
Ainsi va le Sénégal, terre d’imposteurs et d’experts autoproclamés. Des gens qui n’ont été reconnus par aucune instance débitent des sottises et disent des choses qu’ils veulent.
Un comédien, cet ancien ami de Karim Wade avec qui il a fait un peu de prison.
Son doctorat, c’est en science politique, cette matière ou l’absence de rigueur est la règle et qui a accueilli d’autres comme YORO DIA.
C’est la voie de la facilité académique la plus connue pour des gens qui veulent coûte que coûte être « docteur
Mais attention, ils tiennent à leur titre …
J’espère qu’il parle mieux.
Thieyy sénégal...
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