RESPONSE TO LANSANA GAGNY SAKHO'S ARTICLE ON THE "CACOPHONY OF THE SENEGALESE PARAPUBLIC SECTOR": A necessary reform, but a debate that demands rigor (By Souleymane Z Cissokho)

Senegal has embarked on one of the most significant institutional reforms in recent years: the streamlining of the semi-public sector. At first glance, the objective may seem obvious. In a context marked by budgetary constraints, the increasing demand for performance in public spending, and the need for a more transparent administration for both citizens and economic partners, it is legitimate to question the relevance and effectiveness of the numerous public structures created over the years. The figures released during the Council of Ministers meeting on March 4, 2026, illustrate the scale of the phenomenon: the 19 entities targeted for elimination had a combined budget allocation of 28.051 billion FCFA in 2025, an annual payroll of 9.227 billion FCFA, 982 employees, and 2.6 billion FCFA in debt at the end of 2024. Under these circumstances, the desire to streamline the institutional architecture of the State appears not only understandable but also essential. It is within this context that Mr. Lansana Gagny Sakho's analysis is situated, referring to a certain "cacophony" within the Senegalese semi-public sector. In principle, his question deserves to be heard, given that a state aspiring to be modern must avoid institutional overlaps and ensure the clarity of its instruments of action.

However, while the overall diagnosis may seem acceptable, certain sectoral conclusions call for a more nuanced discussion. By denouncing the fragmentation of public action, the analysis sometimes tends to lump together institutions that have neither the same missions, nor the same targets, nor the same economic functions. Yet, in a strategic state, the coexistence of several public instruments is not necessarily synonymous with redundancy; on the contrary, it can reflect a functional specialization essential to the implementation of a coherent economic policy. In other words, the real debate is not only about the number of public agencies but, more fundamentally, concerns the doctrine of the organization of the economic state through the following questions:

- Where should we merge?

- Where should I articulate?

- Where should it be preserved?

It is from this perspective that we should examine the institutions mentioned in Mr. Sakho's article: APIX, ASEPEX, APROSI, BMN, ADEPME, DER/FJ, FONSIS and CDC.

I. APIX, ASEPEX and APROSI: seeking consistency without erasing professions

Regarding the first area, economic development, Mr. Lansana Gagny Sakho's observation reflects a genuine concern. In this respect, for an investor or external economic actor, the Senegalese institutional framework can sometimes appear fragmented.

Indeed, several organizations are involved in this area. APIX focuses primarily on attracting investment and improving the business climate, while ASEPEX supports companies in conquering international markets and developing exports. APROSI, for its part, is involved in the development and promotion of industrial sites.

At first glance, this institutional plurality may give the impression of dispersion. However, when one carefully examines their missions, one finds that they are in reality distinct but complementary economic functions.

- APIX has an impact on investment.

- ASEPEX acts on exports.

- APROSI acts on the industrial infrastructure.

Under these circumstances, the real challenge is not the elimination of these institutions, but the construction of a coherent chain linking investment, industrialization, and exports. Therefore, if rationalization is to occur within this sector, it should primarily aim for improved overall governance, a simplified process for investors, and the pooling of support functions, while preserving the specific expertise of each entity.

II. DER/FJ, ADEPME and BMN: the central confusion of the debate

However, it is in the second section that Mr. Lansana Gagny Sakho's analysis reveals its main limitation. By placing the DER/FJ, ADEPME, and the Upgrading Bureau on the same level, the article implies that these are structures operating within the same functional area. However, a closer analysis reveals that these are actually institutions intervening at different stages of the business development cycle because, at this level:

- The DER primarily focuses on entrepreneurial initiatives and access to financing.

- ADEPME is more involved in supporting, structuring and advising SMEs.

- The Upgrading Bureau, for its part, intervenes in the productive transformation and industrial competitiveness of companies.

This distinction is essential.

BMN does not primarily work on business ideas, but rather intervenes mainly with companies already engaged in real economic activity and possessing a certain level of maturity, in order to support them in a structured modernization process. Consequently, its actions aim in particular to improve productivity, product quality, industrial organization, governance, and the ability to access international markets.

III. A structural need of the Senegalese economic fabric

This mission addresses a well-documented economic reality. SMEs represent 99.8% of the Senegalese economic fabric, generate nearly 80% of jobs, and contribute 36% to GDP. Yet, these businesses continue to face several structural weaknesses. Their access to financing remains limited, a significant proportion of them disappear before even reaching a growth phase, and the productive sector remains largely dominated by the informal economy. In this context, the real challenge for the Senegalese economy is not simply to create more businesses, but rather to transform existing businesses to make them more productive, more structured, and more competitive. It is precisely within this framework that the intervention of the Upgrading Bureau is situated.

IV. FONSIS and CDC: clarifying boundaries without confusing roles

A similar logic can be observed in the third block mentioned in the article, that of FONSIS and the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations du Sénégal.

At first glance, their interventions may sometimes seem to converge when it comes to financing major infrastructure projects. However, their institutional logics remain distinct. FONSIS acts as a sovereign wealth fund designed to catalyze strategic investment and structure high-impact economic projects. Meanwhile, the CDC's primary mission is to secure deposits and consignments and mobilize national savings to finance projects of general interest. Here again, the central issue is not the coexistence of these institutions, but rather the clarity of the intervention doctrine that must govern their interaction.

V. The real issue: a lack of strategic leadership

Ultimately, the debate raised by Mr. Sakho's article highlights a deeper reality. This stems from the fact that Senegal suffers less from simple institutional inflation than from a lack of strategic management of its public instruments. Over time, the State has created several specialized structures – investment, export, entrepreneurship, SMEs, upgrading, sovereign investment, and savings mobilization – without always constructing an architecture that is perfectly understandable through an economic value chain approach.

Therefore, rationalization can only be effective if it is based on a clear method: distinguishing truly redundant structures from those that fulfill a specific and strategic function.

Conclusion: Reforming the state without weakening the economy

Ultimately, Mr. Lansana Gagny Sakho's article has the merit of opening a necessary debate on the coherence of Senegal's semi-public sector. However, this debate must not lead to oversimplification. It is important to note that not all the structures mentioned fall under the same diagnosis. Some need better coordination and refocusing. Conversely, some could be merged. But certain institutions, such as the Upgrading Bureau, fulfill a specific economic function: supporting the productive transformation of businesses and strengthening their competitiveness. In an economy where SMEs strongly dominate with structural vulnerabilities, weakening this instrument would amount to weakening one of the public levers for industrial modernization. State rationalization will be successful if it can distinguish between what is cumbersome and what is transformative. Yes, Senegal can eliminate unnecessary structures. But it must never weaken those that allow its businesses to become more productive, more robust, and more competitive. Because, ultimately, a country's true wealth lies not in the number of its public agencies but rather in the capacity of its economy to produce, innovate and conquer markets.

By Mr. Souleymane Z Cissokho

Expert in economic and financial project evaluation

Director of the research firm Prospect

Tel: 77 765 53 10